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Abandoning the Abandonment Objection: Luck Egalitarian Arguments for 
Public Insurance* 
 
Carl Knight, University of Glasgow and University of Johannesburg 
 
Luck egalitarianism is a family of theories of justice that aim to neutralize the distributive 
impact of luck on people lives (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989). These theories can be seen as 
combining features of both standard left-wing distributive views, such as outcome 
egalitarianism, and traditionally right-wing distributive views, such as right libertarianism. 
Like outcome egalitarianism, luck egalitarianism combats inequalities based on familial 
wealth or class, or natural differences inabilities and talents. But like right libertarianism, luck 
egalitarianism allows distributive outcomes to be strongly influenced by individual choices. 
Luck egalitarianism is typically interpreted by its advocates as broadly supportive of the 
public insurance functions typical of a welfare state, including universal health care and 
unemployment benefits. They see public insurance as a means of realizing the luck 
egalitarian goal of neutralizing the distributive impact of luck by protecting individuals 
against the bad luck of ill health, unemployment, and so on.  
Several critics have cast doubt on this supposed connection between luck 
egalitarianism and the traditional welfare state, and argued that luck egalitarianism has an 
                                                          
* This article was published in Res Publica, 21 (2015), 119-135. The final publication is available at Springer 
via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11158-015-9273-2. Earlier versions were presented at the Universities of 
Copenhagen, Manchester, and Glasgow. Many audience members provided helpful feedback, including Richard 
Child, Ben Colburn, Emily McTernan, Shlomi Segall, and Liam Shields. I am especially grateful to the editors 
of the special issue, Nils Holtug and Xavier Landes, a referee for Res Publica, and Hillel Steiner, who provided 
detailed written comments. Research for this article was supported by the British Academy. 
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objectionably conservative or Thatcherite character (Wolff 1998; Fleurbaey 2001; see also 
Fourie 2012). One objection of this general sort has been a particular focus of discussion in 
the literature (Fleurbaey 1995; Anderson 1999; Scheffler 2003; 2005). This is the ‘harshness 
objection’ or (as I will refer to it) abandonment objection, which is as follows: 
 
Major premise: no plausible theory of justice will abandon individuals to severely 
harmful outcomes. 
Minor premise: luck egalitarianism will abandon individuals to severely harmful 
outcomes. 
Conclusion: luck egalitarianism is not a plausible theory of justice. 
 
To illustrate the objection, Elizabeth Anderson asks us to ‘[c]onsider an uninsured driver who 
negligently makes an illegal turn that causes an accident with another car. … When [the 
emergency services] arrive at the scene and find that the driver at fault is uninsured, they 
leave him to die by the side of the road’ (Anderson 1999, p. 296). According to Anderson and 
other critics such as Fleurbaey and Scheffler, luck egalitarianism has no complaint with 
abandoning the driver – indeed it mandates it – as he has brought about this dire outcome. 
Public insurance is viewed as at odds with luck egalitarianism as the former aims to 
externalize certain costs of individual choice while the latter aims to internalize all costs of 
individual choice, and so refuses some assistance mandated by public insurance. 
 On the face of it, the abandonment objection poses a significant challenge to luck 
egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians have acknowledged as much, and responded to it in 
various ways. In this article I consider seven arguments for the conclusion that luck 
egalitarianism can overcome the objection and provide a plausible egalitarian defence of 
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public insurance. I maintain that, while several of these arguments struggle to gain traction, 
several others succeed.1 
 
1. The Practical Argument 
Some writers have sought to resist the abandonment objection by arguing that, under real 
world conditions, luck egalitarianism as it is normally construed would rarely have grounds 
for departing from the public insurance model. This response resists the minor premise, not 
on the basis that luck egalitarianism is closed in principle to abandonment, but rather by 
raising doubts about the empirical circumstances in which this abandonment would arise. 
 Nicholas Barry provides the fullest version of the practical argument, claiming that 
‘because real world inequalities rarely reflect option luck, the harsh treatment problem will 
not be widespread’ (Barry 2006, p. 97). Option luck arises from ‘deliberate and calculated 
gambles’ in which the agent takes on ‘an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated 
and might have declined’; it contrasts with brute luck, which arises from ‘risks … that are not 
in that sense deliberate gambles’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 293). An option luck outcome is 
standardly taken to be chosen by luck egalitarians and as such, not subject to redistribution 
(Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989). Barry’s remarks suggest four specific reasons for holding that 
option luck inequalities will be few and far between in practice. 
                                                          
1 An eighth counterargument to the abandonment objection rejects the major premise, and argues that justice 
does not require public insurance. As Hillel Steiner emphasized in discussion, avoidance of very bad outcomes 
for all agents, regardless of their actions, may not be an objective of justice. This avoidance might seem either 
not a moral goal at all, or a matter of charity rather than justice (see Cohen 1989, p. 940). While there could well 
be something to that line of thought, many theorists are committed to views (for instance, about basic rights) 
that assume something like the major premise. I will, then, focus on ways of resisting the objection that instead 
involve rejection of the minor premise, and defence of public insurance. 
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 First, ‘it is unusual to have full knowledge of the risks involved in taking a particular 
option’ (Barry 2006, p. 97). The idea, I take it, is that this knowledge shortfall undermines the 
sense in which the choice is a ‘deliberate and calculated gamble’, as option luck requires. 
Barry mentions the example of two individuals pursuing the same profession, but ending up 
with different outcomes on account of unknown talent differences. Second, ‘the outcome an 
individual expects from an action or decision may differ markedly from the actual outcome’ 
(Barry 2006, p. 97). Although Barry does not really distinguish this point from the first, it 
appears to be a second way in which a choice may be less than deliberate and calculated. 
Outcomes may differ from expectations even where knowledge is complete, as is the case in 
many gambles (for instance, a losing ‘odds on’ bet). Third, ‘the need to make a decision is 
foisted upon individuals who are forced to take risks’ (Barry 2006, p. 97). Here option luck 
seems to be undermined as this kind of ‘gambling’ is not declinable. For instance, 
maintaining a decent standard of living generally requires an occupation, selection of which 
is a kind of ‘compulsory gamble’. Finally, ‘even in advanced capitalist nations, large 
inequalities in income, wealth, education and family background mean that individuals 
choose from very different positions’ (Barry 2006, p. 98). Barry and other defenders of the 
practical argument such as Kristin Voigt (2007, p. 395-396) suggest that where starting 
positions are influenced by these factors, the inequalities that are later generated are infused 
with brute luck. 
 While these four factors may work to reduce the amount of option luck inequality in 
society, I doubt that their impact would be as pronounced as Barry suggests. First, Barry 
intends to be using option luck and brute luck in Dworkin’s sense, but it does not seem that 
Dworkin requires full knowledge, or anything close to it, for option luck to apply. A gamble 
might be deliberate and calculated even if the facts on which the calculations are based are to 
some extent mistaken. Second, it seems clear that other ways in which outcomes differ from 
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expectations, such as a ‘long shot’ gamble being won or a ‘sure thing’ gamble being lost, are 
quite compatible with (indeed, necessary for) option luck. Third, ‘compulsory gambles’ seem 
also to be cases of option luck, at least provided a sufficient range of alternative gamble are 
available, as the gamble taken could have been declined for another gamble. Occupational 
choices, for instance, are paradigmatic instances of deliberate and calculated gambles that 
could have been declined. Finally, while it is certainly correct that differences in, for instance, 
family background influence individuals’ choices and should be accounted for on a luck 
egalitarian scheme, it is hard to see the choices they make as ‘reflect[ing] brute bad luck, not 
bad option luck’, at least for the reasons Barry mentions (Barry 2006, p. 98). For instance, 
virtually no one in the situation of Anderson’s negligent driver could really claim that their 
situation of urgent medical need came about as the result of a disadvantaged upbringing. Few 
of the millions of people with a similar upbringing (whatever that may be) put themselves in 
such a situation. This is clear when considering, say, a working class negligent driver, and 
even more apparent for middle or upper class negligent drivers. Such negligent drivers seem, 
therefore, to be victims of bad option luck, not, as Barry implies, bad brute luck. 
 In sum, then, it does not seem that the abandonment objection can be resisted on 
practical grounds. Individuals appear to often be badly off due to bad option luck, in which 
case they have no luck egalitarian claim to be protected by public insurance. 
 
2. The Sufficiency Argument 
A different way of defending luck egalitarianism against the abandonment objection accepts 
that vanilla luck egalitarianism has a problem with abandonment, but maintains that this does 
not require us to reject the view tout court. Rather, this argument says we should combine 
luck egalitarianism with sufficientarianism – the view that everyone having a minimum 
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threshold of goods (or as close to this as is possible) is the highest distributive goal (Frankfurt 
1988; Crisp 2003). 
Sufficientarianism is not ‘responsibility sensitive’ as luck egalitarianism is. It requires 
that everyone receives ‘enough’ (e.g. has their basic needs satisfied or their basic capabilities 
secured) regardless of their choices. As such, sufficientarianism provides a very 
straightforward justification for public insurance. It wholeheartedly agrees that abandonment 
is unacceptable, as the major premise maintains, and ensures that it never arises. Barry 
defends the combination of luck egalitarianism and sufficientarianism on the basis that ‘it 
seems fair that each person is equally guaranteed the capabilities needed to participate fully in 
a democratic society, in return for the freedom that they have lost in the state of nature’ 
(Barry 2006, p. 100). Paula Casal likewise argues that ‘sufficiency-constrained luck 
egalitarianism’ provides an appealing compromise, as ‘[m]aintaining equality of outcome 
involves restricting individuals’ choices, or extending their liabilities for others’ choices, to 
an excessive degree. By contrast, preserving sufficiency tends to require less costly 
restrictions on liberty’ (Casal 2007, p. 322). The sufficiency argument has also been 
advanced by Alexander Brown (2005, pp. 307-8) and, arguably, Daniel Markovits (2008, p. 
281).2 
 One obvious limitation of the sufficiency argument is that it seems at odds with luck 
egalitarian principle (Voigt 2007, p. 405). The argument assumes that luck egalitarianism is 
(to use Casal’s term) ‘constrained’ by sufficiency. In other words, sufficientarianism receives 
lexical priority over luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarian norms will only be consulted at all 
                                                          
2 Markovits grounds assistance to the option luck needy on ‘humanitarian considerations’ rather than on (non-
luck egalitarian) distributive justice considerations, and as such might be described as endorsing a non-justicial 
form of the sufficiency argument. His argument is distinguished from those of Tan and Segall discussed below 
as it sees humanitarian considerations as ‘outweigh[ing] distributive justice in appropriate circumstances’ 
(Markovits 2008, p. 281). 
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once sufficiency norms are satisfied. While complementing luck egalitarianism with some 
other principle may seem an appealing way for a luck egalitarianism to respond to the 
abandonment objection, the sufficiency argument proposes not just a complement but a 
replacement for luck egalitarianism as the first port of call for justice. Luck egalitarianism 
remains only in a diminished, tie-breaking capacity. In many circumstances sufficientarian 
considerations would not tie, and so luck egalitarianism would have no influence at all. If we 
must emaciate luck egalitarianism to this extent in order to meet the challenge posed by 
abandonment, we have not really shown that luck egalitarianism can respond to it. Indeed, we 
are thereby accepting not just the critical message but also a large part of the positive 
proposal of critics such as Anderson, an avowed sufficientarian (Anderson 2010). 
 There are also strong external (i.e., all-things-considered rather than specifically luck 
egalitarian) reasons for rejecting sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism. It has 
implausible implications in cases where we have to choose between (1) not quite enough for 
half the population and much more than enough for the other half, with everyone’s holdings 
in line with their choices, and (2) just enough for everyone, with no one’s holdings in line 
with their choices. For instance, where 100 units is enough, and individuals’ choice have 
resulted in a status quo of (200, 99.9), it would prefer a move to a responsibility-insensitive 
(100, 100). This amounts to giving up a massive earned benefit for half the population for the 
sake of an almost negligible unearned benefit for the other half. 
That (100, 100) is a much more outcome-equal distribution may seem to count in its 
favour. But if that is a good reason for favouring (100,100), we should reject 
sufficientarianism for the different reason that it is not responsive to that reason. Given (100, 
100) is the only available distribution that secures enough, only the sufficientarian component 
of the view, which has no concern with reducing inequalities (i.e. relative differences), is 
consulted in this case, so (100, 100)’s outcome-equal nature did not count in its favour. In 
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fact sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism would prefer (300, 100, 100) to (200, 200, 
99.9), though the former is a much more unequal distribution, both intuitively and in 
technical (e.g. Gini co-efficient) terms. In short, if one has even weak egalitarian and/or 
efficiency-orientated and/or responsibility sensitivity intuitions, one should reject sufficiency-
constrained luck egalitarianism. Whether it is true, as Casal claims, that ‘preserving 
sufficiency tends to require less costly restrictions on liberty’, is an empirical issue. But what 
we can say is that, at the level of principle (i.e. the level at which we choose between 
conceptions of justice), sufficiency-constrained luck egalitarianism is willing to pay 
unacceptably high costs (including liberty costs – the numbers above could be units of 
freedom) for the sake of very small improvements for those marginally below the threshold 
of enough (see Arneson 2006; Casal 2007; Holtug 2010). We might say that 
sufficientarianism justifies too much public insurance – far more than any developed country 
would countenance. It would, for instance, be willing to expend a limitless amount of 
healthcare resources marginally improving a single very ill individual’s circumstances, even 
if that made society as a whole much worse off and less equal and the individual was 
responsible for bringing about their illness.3 The sufficiency argument is not the right answer 
to the abandonment objection.  
                                                          
3 Further examination diagnoses the problem. In the main statements of the abandonment objection it is always 
assumed that the ‘negligent victim’ (to use Anderson’s term) faces a severe loss if treatment is not forthcoming. 
In setting out his version of the objection, Marc Fleurbaey is explicit that ‘[i]t is not only whether [negligent 
victim of a motorcycle accident] Bert is responsible or not which matters, but also the amount of welfare loss he 
is about to suffer following his mistake’ (Fleurbaey 1995, 40). But if (part) of the problem in abandonment cases 
is the magnitude of the loss faced, sufficientarianism is the wrong solution. As we have seen, it is indifferent 
both to the size of the loss faced and the cost of averting it. It is overkill for the problem at hand, for it will not 
only prevent abandonment in cases where the stakes are high, but also step in, at potentially massive cost, in 
9 
 
 
3. The Domain Argument 
The next argument to be considered, the domain argument, has been advanced by Kok-Chor 
Tan. It is a close relative of the sufficiency argument, and like that argument accepts the 
major premise without qualification and aims to provide a universal public insurance scheme. 
The domain argument differs from the sufficiency argument in that it does not accept, as the 
sufficiency argument does, that luck egalitarianism must be constrained to prevent 
abandonment cases. 
 Tan’s innovation is to suggest that luck egalitarianism applies only within the domain 
of distributive justice, construed in a special way. He ‘understand[s] distributive justice to be 
concerned with how persons fare in relation to each other above a threshold of sufficiency. A 
distributive principle is thus comparative, but also operational on the presumption that basic 
needs (however defined) are being met’ (Tan 2012, p. 100). By contrast, the domain below 
the sufficiency threshold is governed by ‘humanitarianism’ (Tan 2012, p. 101). This move 
has exactly the result the luck egalitarian is looking for: abandonment is ruled out (by 
humanitarianism) in such a way that luck egalitarianism can still apply with full force 
(because it makes no claims in the humanitarian domain to start with). As such the argument 
has a clear advantage over the sufficiency argument. 
 There are, nevertheless, two significant weaknesses with the argument. First, while 
the domain argument does not violate luck egalitarian principle as the sufficiency argument 
does, it does not overcome the second weakness of the sufficiency argument: its willingness 
to accept huge costs in exchange for tiny benefits that bring individuals up to the threshold. In 
the case of the domain argument, we do not even get to consider distributive justice until 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
cases where the loss faced is very small but nevertheless sufficient to drop someone marginally below the 
threshold. 
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humanitarianism is satisfied. So if a tiny below-threshold benefit will place an individual at 
the threshold, rather than very slightly below it, we will have to provide that benefit in the 
name of humanitarianism, no matter how much this violates efficiency, equality, 
responsibility-sensitivity, or other values. Humanitarianism is given lexical priority over 
distributive justice in Tan’s scheme, just as sufficiency had lexical priority over luck 
egalitarianism in Casal’s. Both approaches have the same counterintuitive results. 
 Second, Tan’s demarcation of domains has unwelcome side effects. I will mention 
three points here. Firstly, Tan requires us to reject the standard idea that the distribution of 
benefits and burdens is the domain of distributive justice. Rather, only a subset of these 
distributions (those above a certain threshold) count as matters of distributive justice. This is 
quite a radical reconceptualization of the terrain, which stands in need of a justification that 
Tan does not really provide. Secondly, and in consequence, the domain argument seems to 
describe some cases that are clearly matters of justice as matters of humanitarianism. On 
Tan’s account, an injured motorist’s claim to treatment should be articulated in the language 
of humanitarianism; justice has nothing to do with it. But it seems implausible that it is 
merely humanitarian for the state to provide a citizen with possibly very cheap and life-
saving treatment. As Eugen Huzum (2011, p. 49) observes, ‘[w]hat Anderson holds against 
luck egalitarians is not the fact that they cannot morally justify the help for victims of 
carelessness, but the fact that they cannot justify it on behalf of their conception of 
distributive justice’. Finally, Tan’s humanitarian principles are presumably enforceable by 
coercion, just as distributive justice principles are – otherwise his view could be accused of 
allowing abandonment after all. But it seems counterintuitive to suppose that we could be 
legitimately coerced into doing the merely humanitarian. For instance, if it would be unjust 
for me not to pay my taxes that will help pay for needy others’ medical treatment via a public 
insurance scheme, that seems like a compelling reason for me to be forced to pay my taxes. 
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But if it would not be unjust for me not to pay my taxes, but only inhumanitarian, it does not 
seem that there is a compelling reason for me to be forced to pay my taxes, and it may even 
seem wrong to coerce me in this way. In short, the domain argument conflicts with our usual 
conceptualization of distributive justice, with our intuitive identification of specific cases as 
matters of justice, and with a common view about the permissibility of coercion. 
 While Tan does not argue directly for these conclusions, he does try to sweeten the 
pill. He says that his division into distributive justice and humanitarian domains ‘is neither 
eccentric nor arbitrary, but is in fact a commonplace in contemporary political philosophy’ 
(Tan 2012, p. 101). His evidence here is Rawls (1999) and Nagel (2005) similarly holding 
that non-justicial principles require basic needs to be met. But even if Rawls and Nagel held a 
relevantly similar view about domains, that fact would not be an argument for that view. 
Furthermore, Rawls’ and Nagel’s views differ in an important respect from Tan’s. While 
Tan’s view implies that even claims within a state for basic needs satisfaction are not matters 
of justice, Rawls and Nagel insist that such claims are matters of justice. For this reason, they 
do not conceptualize distributive justice as never applying below the threshold of basic needs, 
they do not make a citizens’ claim for basic needs satisfaction against the state a matter of 
humanitarianism, nor would humanitarianism require coercive enforcement. In short, while 
Rawls and Nagel do allow for humanitarian principles as Tan does, they do not draw a hard 
and fast distinction between humanitarianism and distributive justice at the threshold of basic 
needs satisfaction. It is that feature which leads the domain view to require radical and more 
or less undefended departures from standard views about justice. This is a second good 
reason for rejecting the view. 
 
4. The Equality Argument 
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Shlomi Segall has advanced an argument that, like Tan’s, aims to combine luck 
egalitarianism with sufficiency without making the latter constrain the former. While Tan’s 
strategy relies on a view about the proper domain of luck egalitarianism, Segall’s relies on a 
view about luck egalitarianism’s basic distributive judgments. As it relies on assigning an 
(even) greater importance to equality than standard luck egalitarianism does, I will call it the 
equality argument. 
 While all luck egalitarians object to brute luck inequality, most also object to brute 
luck equality. This seems to follow straightforwardly from the view’s central concern with 
‘extinguish[ing] the influence on distribution of … brute luck’ (Cohen 1989, p. 908). 
Suppose, for instance, that Bill and Ben are identical to begin with, but Bill works harder than 
Ben and as a result becomes much better off than him. However, Bill then suffers terrible 
brute bad luck – a meteorite strike reduces his advantage (welfare, resource, or capability) 
level to that of Ben. Though the outcome is equal, that is only due to a strong brute luck 
influence. It seems clear that luck egalitarian will require that brute luck to be neutralized, if 
possible, and the inequality between Bill and Ben restored. 
 Though this is the standard reading of luck egalitarianism, a different reading is 
possible (Segall 2010, ch. 1; Segall 2012). Segall notes that, as the view is described by Larry 
Temkin and the critic Susan Hurley, luck egalitarianism is only concerned with counteracting 
brute luck where it creates inequality. On that view, equality is always unobjectionable, even 
if it arises due to brute luck. Furthermore, Segall argues that this alternative reading is in fact 
the best version of luck egalitarianism. Although he makes several points here, the most 
relevant for our discussion is the way it allows luck egalitarianism to resist the abandonment 
objection (Segall 2010, ch. 4). Because negligent victims are very badly off, anything that 
improves their condition will reduce outcome inequality. Any assistance offered to a 
negligent victim will therefore be unobjectionable, because luck egalitarianism on Segall’s 
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account never objects to outcome equality (or reductions in inequality). This only establishes 
that luck egalitarianism is ‘indeterminate’ (Segall 2010, p. 65) in abandonment cases – it will 
allow either assistance or non-assistance, the former because it reduces inequality, the latter 
because it reduces the impact of brute luck. It may seem that luck egalitarianism therefore 
still allows abandonment. Abandonment might indeed arise were luck egalitarianism the only 
moral principle in play. But Segall maintains that luck egalitarians should be pluralists, 
combining their luck egalitarianism with a principle ensuring that basic needs are met. This 
ensures that public insurance be put in place. 
According to the equality argument, the basic needs principle does not constrain luck 
egalitarianism, as Segall’s version of luck egalitarianism never objects to increased equality. 
The equality argument therefore overcomes a major shortfall of the sufficiency argument – its 
requirement that luck egalitarianism be constrained. It also does not require any special 
demarcation of the conceptual space occupied by distributive justice.4 The equality argument 
therefore also has an advantage over the domain argument. 
Despite these strengths, the argument faces two problems. First, like the sufficiency 
argument and domain argument, it is willing to accept huge costs in exchange for tiny 
benefits that bring individuals up to the threshold. Although the basic needs principle is not 
assigned lexical priority by the equality argument, as it is by the other arguments, there are 
similar results. This is because Segall’s luck egalitarianism is ‘indeterminate’ in typical cases 
of negligent victims, so the decision rests with the basic needs principle. Assistance will be 
                                                          
4 Although Segall seems to treat the basic needs principle as something external to distributive justice, the 
argument would work equally well were this principle and luck egalitarianism simply treated as complementary 
components of distributive justice. 
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provided regardless of cost in terms of efficiency, equality and responsibility sensitivity, and 
regardless of how little benefit the victim gets out of the assistance.5 
Second, Segall’s view of luck egalitarianism as never objecting to equality seems 
implausible both as an interpretation of the luck egalitarian ideal and as a self-standing theory 
(Knight 2011; Albertsen and Midtgaard 2014). As I have mentioned, luck egalitarianism is 
standardly construed as counteracting brute luck’s influence on distributions, a stance that 
clearly places it at odds with brute luck equality. There are, moreover, good reasons for this. 
In trying to explain the appeal of luck egalitarianism, one is immediately drawn to cases in 
which one individual, such as Bill, works harder than another, such as Ben. A great 
advantage of luck egalitarianism is its apparent result that Bill gets a better outcome than 
Ben. It is hard to see how luck egalitarianism can claim to capture a central part of the appeal 
of the conservative right, as Cohen (1989, p. 933) famously claimed it did, if it would allow 
the equalization of outcomes for hard workers and the lazy, as Segall proposes. 
                                                          
5 A referee suggests that this is an unfair assessment of Segall’s view. In chapter 8 of Health, Luck, and Justice, 
Segall argues that, in order to avoid levelling down, we should actually endorse a ‘luck prioritarian’ rather than 
a luck egalitarian principle of justice. A prioritarian will presumably not be indifferent to cost or size of benefits. 
However, I am here concerned with assessing whether the equality argument succeeds in providing a luck 
egalitarian rationale for public insurance, and luck prioritarianism will evidently not help in that respect. First, it 
is unclear whether it would actually justify public insurance. Segall (2011, 119) himself notes that his specific 
version of luck prioritarianism ‘tells us to compare levels of prudence first, and use the severity of the medical 
condition only as a tie-breaker between those who were equally prudent in looking after their health. That 
appears not only harsh but impractical’. Second, even if it justifies public insurance, it would not seem to do so 
on luck egalitarian grounds. Finally, even if it justifies public insurance, and even if it is thought to do so on 
luck egalitarian grounds (perhaps because one has an unusually capacious understanding of equality that 
encompasses prioritarianism), it clearly does not do so on grounds that have anything to do with the equality 
argument. The equality argument’s key feature is its acceptance of brute luck equality, a feature that is entirely 
absent from luck prioritarianism. 
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We have found that four luck egalitarian arguments for public insurance in the 
literature do not succeed. Three of these arguments have a common flaw: a sufficientarian or 
quasi-sufficientarian commitment to providing a threshold of goods come what may. This 
may seem discouraging. How is a luck egalitarian theory to ensure abandonment does not 
happen, if not by providing a separate guarantee for basic needs or capabilities? I will now 
argue that such an external guarantee is not only an unacceptable addition to luck 
egalitarianism but an unnecessary one.6 Luck egalitarian properly construed contains within 
itself the resources required to justify public insurance and resist the abandonment objection. 
 
5. The Identity Argument 
The first argument that has some significant degree of success concerns the identity and self-
interest of negligent victims over time. Luck egalitarianism is usually understood as treating 
an agent, a, at t2 as fully accountable for actions taken at t1, provided that the agent that took 
those actions was numerically identical to a (i.e. they are one and the same person). In 
assessing what a is now due, we are to fully take into account prior actions by people 
numerically identical to a, and should not take into account prior actions by people non-
identical to a. 
 The central role this standard account implicitly gives to identity is challenged by the 
following example (Wiggins 1967; Parfit 1984, pp. 254-261). Suppose a has two cerebral 
hemispheres, each containing a’s complete psychology. One hemisphere is transplanted into 
b*, while the other hemisphere is destroyed. It seems that b* is numerically identical to a, i.e. 
that a is b*. Furthermore, it seems that luck egalitarianism will uncontroversially treat a’s 
actions as relevant when assessing what b* is due. But now consider a different world in 
which two recipients, b and c, each receive a cerebral hemisphere from a. Moreover, while b 
                                                          
6 I did not recognize this in earlier work; see Knight 2005. 
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and c have equally strong cases for being identical with a, they cannot be numerically 
identical with a. If a was identical to either of them, the ordinary (transitive) view of identity 
would imply that b and c were identical with each other. But simultaneously existing people, 
like b and c, cannot be identical. Therefore a is identical to neither b nor c.  
As a is not identical with (the same person as) b or c, the usual interpretation of luck 
egalitarianism will not treat a’s actions as relevant when assessing what b and c are now due. 
For instance, Arneson’s account would not permit b or c to be better off than d, even if a had 
made highly beneficial choices and d had made highly destructive choices, as his principle 
requires that ‘any actual inequality of welfare … is due to factors that lie within each 
individual’s control’ (Arneson 1989, p. 86). Clearly, a’s beneficial choices did not lie within 
the control of individuals b or c – they lay within the control of a different individual, a. This 
counts against the standard interpretation of luck egalitarianism. It is counterintuitive for b 
and c to be denied the benefits of a’s choices. Brain division and similar cases suggest that 
luck egalitarians should focus not on identity but on whatever it is that matters for 
responsibility. It is fair to treat b and c differently than we otherwise would on account of a’s 
responsible choice, because what matters for responsibility is present.  
What matters for responsibility is presumably some aspect of psychology. For present 
purposes, we need not settle exactly which aspect. It is at this point that we return to the 
abandonment objection. If what matters for responsibility is psychological, we may have a 
response to that objection (Navin 2011; Tomlin 2012). Consider a negligent victim such as 
Bert, who Fleurbaey describes as having ‘freely adopted a negligent and reckless character. 
In particular, he enjoys having his hair blown by the wind when he rides his motorbike on the 
highway, and he seldom wears a helmet even though he has one and it is compulsory to wear 
it. One morning he takes out his motorbike to pay a visit to his parents, and, on leaving them, 
spurns his mother's warnings about the helmet, saying: “I prefer to take the risk and enjoy the 
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wind!”’ (Fleurbaey 1995, p. 40). When Bert is subsequently injured, it seems very likely that 
a significant psychological change will occur. For instance, Bert may acquire a generally 
lower level of risk aversion, and be more ready to take the advice of others seriously. It is 
quite possible for the psychological changes to be sufficient that what matters for 
responsibility is no longer present. In other words, post-accident Bert may be considered 
sufficiently different from pre-accident Bert that we do not assign the costs of the latter’s 
choices to the former. Or it may be that what matters for responsibility remains present, but to 
a diminished extent, in which case we will assign the costs of pre-accident Bert’s choices to 
post-accident Bert at a discounted rate.  
In this partial responsibility scenario, which is perhaps the most likely, we would not 
deny post-accident Bert the treatment he needs, as it would be unfair to make him bear the 
full injury-without-treatment result of pre-accident Bert’s choice. The most likely luck 
egalitarian response would be to provide Bert with his medical treatment, but to stop short of 
‘making him whole’, as we would for a victim of brute bad luck. We might, for instance, 
refuse to pay for non-essential aspects of Bert’s hospital stay, refuse to repair or replace his 
motorcycle, refuse compensation for any distress or loss of earnings associated with the 
injury, and insist on a co-payment where possible. This is still sufficient to see off the 
abandonment objection, as it treats Bert as insured against the most severe consequences of 
his actions.   
In some actual cases of negligent victims, it may be that the victim does not undergo a 
what matters-undermining psychological change. But in practice it would be essentially 
impossible to distinguish this situation from the (I suspect more common) situation of a 
negligent victim undergoing a relevant psychological change. A luck egalitarian government 
therefore has good grounds for treating any negligent victim as only partially accountable for 
the bad outcome, and thus as partially insured. Without such public insurance the state would 
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run a high risk of the very severe wrong of leaving someone very badly off (on the brink of 
death, even) through no fault or choice of their own.7 
The identity argument shows that the abandonment objection cannot simply assume 
that, where someone brings a very bad outcome upon themselves, luck egalitarianism 
requires that that outcome be fully assigned to that individual. We have seen that there are 
reasons quite independent of the abandonment objection for luck egalitarianism to require not 
merely that the person who brought about the bad outcome is the same person as the person 
bearing its costs. In addition, it must be shown that these two people (or versions of the same 
person) stand fully in the relation that matters for responsibility. It may be that the persons 
that result from the traumatic events typically described in abandonment cases rarely, if ever, 
stand fully in the relation that matters to their earlier selves, in which case assistance should 
be forthcoming. 
 
6. The Luck Argument 
A second way of defusing the abandonment objection emerges, in similar fashion to the 
identity argument, as a response to a quite different problem with standard luck 
egalitarianism. In this case the problem concerns the usual way in which the luck egalitarian 
goal of neutralizing the distributive effects of luck is interpreted. Standardly, this goal is 
understood as requiring not that all luck is neutralized, but rather that brute luck is 
neutralized. Option luck’s influence on distributions is viewed as unproblematic. 
                                                          
7 While this argument, like any application of a distributive theory, relies on claims that are in part empirical, 
these claims are not nearly as strong as the claims made by the practical argument discussed earlier. For 
instance, the identity argument’s claim that people who impose severe costs on themselves often undergo what 
matters-undermining psychological change seems far less controversial than the practical argument’s claim that 
some being initially better off than others is a general option-luck undermining social condition. 
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 This view is challenged by cases where individuals are prudentially required to 
expose themselves to option luck. Suppose, for instance, that Ned and Oliver each face the 
choice between the guarantee of 100 units of advantage, or a gamble giving them a 95% 
chance of 200 and a 5% chance of 100, with no relevant previous choices having been made 
(Lippert-Rasmussen 2001, pp. 572-573). Clearly, prudence requires that both accept the 
gamble. Suppose they do, and Oliver wins, getting 200, and Ned loses, getting 100. This 
outcome appears to be straightforwardly a matter of option luck as Dworkin describes it. The 
agents participated in ‘deliberately and calculated gambles’, and each of them accepted ‘an 
isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined’. Yet many people 
will feel that it is unfair that Ned became worse off than Oliver as a result of this process. I 
think luck egalitarians will feel this particularly strongly. The case of Ned and Oliver is not 
analogous to a case where one person works harder or makes a better decision than the other, 
in which the luck egalitarian will be happy for there to be an outcome inequality. Ned and 
Oliver worked equally hard and made identical choices. Nor is it even parallel to a typical 
case of gambling, where the gamblers risk-seeking is reflected in the unequal outcome. Ned 
and Oliver would have chosen to take the gamble even if they were highly risk averse, as 
there was no downside to it. The inequality between Ned and Oliver feels like a pure case of 
luck influencing distribution. The fact that Ned made a choice, where that is a choice that 
anyone would make, does not seem to justify an unequal outcome. 
 It seems that we should interpret the luck neutralizing goal in a way that is open to 
restoring equality between Ned and Oliver. One approach, suggested by Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen (2001; see also Barry 2008), is to distinguish gambles proper, where the gambler 
would prefer facing the risk to simply receiving the expected outcome, to the quasi-gambles, 
where the gambler would prefer the expected outcome to risk. We could then seek to insure 
or pool the effects of quasi-gamble option luck but allow the effects of gamble proper option 
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luck to stand. So if Ned’s and Oliver’s reasons for accepting the gamble were simply because 
it offered the best expected outcome, they would be classed as quasi-gamblers and the 
outcome would be equalized.  
There are, however, good reasons to reject quasi-gamble neutralizing luck 
egalitarianism. First, whether someone is a quasi-gambler or gambler proper may itself be a 
matter of brute luck. If we made gamblers proper but not quasi-gamblers bear the full costs of 
their choices, we would thereby require some people to bear high costs on account of their 
brute bad luck of being gamblers proper, contrary to a central luck egalitarian tenet. Second, 
the difference between a quasi-gambler and gambler proper may be tiny. I may prefer to face 
(0.05*100, 0.95*200) to receiving 194.9 guaranteed, but prefer 195 to facing (0.05*100, 
0.95*200). It is hard to see how such small differences in preferences can be the difference 
between full and zero compensation for bad option luck. Finally, if Ned is a quasi-gambler 
and Oliver is a gambler proper, it seems that we must neutralize luck for Ned but allow it to 
stand for Oliver. But these are contradictory injunctions as we cannot neutralize luck for Ned 
and offset his unexpected shortfall without dipping into Oliver’s winnings. 
I believe a more plausible approach is to interpret the luck neutralizing goal in the 
most straightforward terms. We neutralize all option luck, just as all brute luck is equalized. 
This view is known as ‘all-luck egalitarianism’ (Segall 2010, ch. 3). On my favoured version 
of the view, individuals receive the expected value of their choices except where they non-
culpably lack the ability to anticipate that value, or there is an insufficient level of societal 
resources to meet expectations (Knight 2013). An obvious complaint with this view is that 
‘redistribution from winners to losers in gambles would be to deprive both of lives they 
prefer’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 295). My response is simply that this curtailment of available 
lifestyles is for egalitarianism (≠all-things-considered justice) a price worth paying to prevent 
the emergence of inequalities grounded in luck. 
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All-luck egalitarianism appears to offer a very strong justification for public 
insurance. The cases Anderson and Fleurbaey describe feature unexpectedly bad results of 
decisions. Usually, making an illegal turn or riding a motorcycle without a helmet does not 
result in a near-fatal injury; the vast majority of the time, people suffer no ill effects at all 
from such decisions. The expected value of these choices, which sets the all-luck egalitarian 
level of compensation, is much higher than the actual results prior to any assistance. This 
mandates public insurance pay outs sufficient to restore the (negligent) victim to the level of 
advantage they could antecedently have expected. The assistance would be paid for, in large 
part, by individuals who receive better than expected outcomes. This includes individuals 
who make illegal turns or ride motorcycles without helmets. For instance, using the numbers 
in my earlier extension of the Bert example, if Bert did not crash he would have received 10 
units of advantage, more than his expectation of 9.9 units. 
 
7. The Free Will Argument 
Examples of abandonment in the literature typically involve agents of luck egalitarianism 
assessing people in very bad situations as having brought those situations about. The final 
counterargument to the abandonment objection suggests that that assessment would not be 
made in the first place, on account of doubts about free will and responsibility. 
 Major luck egalitarian writers such as Arneson, Cohen, and Temkin favour a ‘thin’ 
account of choice and responsibility. They do not make it part of their theory to specify the 
conditions for something to count as chosen. They are willing to accept the best answer to 
that question that moral philosophers and metaphysicians can come up with. As Temkin 
(2011, p. 55) puts it, ‘justice is inextricably tied to the mare’s nest of free will’, though he 
himself doesn’t ‘have the foggiest idea how to solve the mare’s nest of (meaningful!) free 
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will’. In short, then, the standard view of luck egalitarianism assigns a role to choice, but it 
does not say (or even try to say) what choice actually is. 
 Notwithstanding the above view, evident in the earliest and best known statements of 
full-blown luck egalitarianism (Arneson 1989; Cohen 1989), critics of luck egalitarianism 
have generally presented the abandonment objection in ways that suggest that choice can be 
assigned on the basis of common sense. Anderson’s presentation features ‘[w]itnesses 
call[ing] the police, reporting who is at fault’ and a similarly philosophically sparse ‘judicial 
hearing [that] has found him [the negligent victim] at fault for the accident’ (Anderson 1999, 
pp. 295, 296). Fleurbaey (1995) and Scheffler (2003; 2005), while recognizing the deep 
questions raised by choice, nevertheless treat luck egalitarianism as having the clear 
implication that the likes of Bert are responsible for putting themselves in a bad situation. 
This may be partly on account of Dworkin’s view that we should, for distributive purposes, 
set aside any philosophical doubts we have about our choices and accept responsibility for 
them (Dworkin 2000, 323). This is, however, not a view accepted by many luck egalitarians 
(Dworkin (2003) himself denies that he is luck egalitarian). 
 On the standard, thin account of choice, whether an agent ultimately is or is not 
responsible for being in a highly disadvantaging position becomes a difficult question. To 
answer it comprehensively we would need to resolve the problem of free will and 
determinism, among other things. While this presents a challenge for the abandonment 
objection, it also seems to endanger the practicality of luck egalitarianism. There is, however, 
a response for luck egalitarianism here, and furthermore, a response that provides a 
justification for public insurance. Given our actual situation of uncertainty about several 
crucial moral and metaphysical issues, the best route for the luck egalitarian is to make 
practical judgments on the basis of a best guess about these issues (Knight 2009, ch. 5). We 
cannot be sure that sceptical views about free will and responsibility (such as hard 
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determinism) are wrong, so the appropriate response will account for the possibility that they 
are correct. This means that even the most seemingly clear cut cases of fault should be treated 
as partially non-culpable. Thus even actions of the likes of Bert should be treated as partially 
insured, on account of the possibility that it is impossible for anyone to be truly responsible 
for some outcome. Abandonment would never arise under luck egalitarianism, as the minor 
premise claimed it would, on account of our general uncertainty about the morals and 
metaphysics of responsibility. 
 The free will argument seems to be an especially secure basis on which to defend 
public insurance. Whereas the identity argument and luck argument rely on revisions to the 
standard luck egalitarian position, the free will argument works for the standard version. We 
do not need to revise luck egalitarianism so much as draw attention to oft-overlooked features 
of it. 
 It might seem strange to argue that the great difficulty involved in determining 
responsibility strengthens the luck egalitarian position. As a referee objected, surely this is ‘a 
general problem for luck egalitarianism rather than a way out of the abandonment objection’. 
But the nature of the ‘general problem’ – it being hard to apply luck egalitarianism in a clear 
cut way – means it is a perfect solution to the problem of abandonment, as that problem arises 
precisely where luck egalitarianism is applied in a clear cut way. Were we certain that 
negligent victims were fully responsible for their bad situations, luck egalitarianism would 
require us to abandon them. But we can never have that certainty, so we have to apply luck 
egalitarianism in a messier way that involves some level of assistance for the prima facie 
negligent. If we take the ‘general problem’ seriously, as I think we must, the conditions 
required for the problem of abandonment no longer apply.8 
                                                          
8 There is the separate issue of how much of a problem the ‘general problem’ is itself for luck egalitarianism. As 
this is a distinct objection to the abandonment objection, a full appraisal is beyond the scope of this article, but 
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 It is, finally, worth noting some similarities and differences between the arguments we 
have been considering. In generating luck egalitarian arguments for public insurance, one can 
revise either luck egalitarianism itself, or the understanding of the world in which it would be 
applied. The free will and practical arguments take the latter strategy, each suggesting that, as 
it happens, luck egalitarianism would not identify pure cases of negligent victims. But ‘as it 
happens’ is a confusingly broad category, which in the case of the free will argument is 
understood as including metaphysical and even (non-luck egalitarian) normative theory about 
responsibility. The practical argument, on the other hand, is essentially an argument of social 
science, which involves no philosophical claims beyond those of luck egalitarianism itself. 
Contrasting with the practical and free will arguments are the sufficiency, domain, equality, 
and luck arguments, which principally turn on normative revisions of (or additions to) luck 
egalitarianism. The identity argument lies between these two groups, making distinctive 
claims about the metaphysical landscape in which luck egalitarianism finds itself, and 
suggesting that, given this landscape, luck egalitarianism requires revision. 
 
8. Conclusion 
I have surveyed seven counterarguments to the abandonment objection to luck egalitarianism. 
Each of these arguments resists the minor premise of the argument, maintaining that luck 
egalitarianism protects negligent victims via public insurance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
two points are worth mentioning. First, the fact that a normative principle is difficult to apply is a rather weak 
objection to it. It is not a challenge to its normative content, so the adherent of the principle can accept the 
objection without revising or rejecting their principles. Certainly, it would be better to accept a correct 
normative principle that was hard to apply rather than an incorrect one that was easy to apply. Second, I actually 
doubt that luck egalitarianism is really all that difficult to apply. For a simple model comparing luck 
egalitarianism and outcome egalitarianism in this respect see Knight and Knight 2012. 
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The first four arguments were unsuccessful. The practical argument failed to establish 
that specific features of the world make it unusual for people to be in a very bad situation as a 
matter of option luck. The next three arguments combined luck egalitarianism with 
sufficientarianism or quasi-sufficientarianism. Each of them struggles due to 
sufficientarianism’s acceptance of huge costs in exchange for tiny benefits that bring 
individuals up to the threshold, and each also faces additional problems. The sufficiency 
argument violates luck egalitarian principles, the domain argument relies on a 
counterintuitive conceptualization of the space of distributive justice, while the equality 
argument requires equal outcomes for hard workers and the lazy.  
I then considered three arguments that succeeded in justifying universal public 
insurance. The identity argument showed that, even where an individual was responsible for 
bringing about some bad outcome, there may be good reasons for not now assigning the 
entirety of that outcome to that individual. The luck argument showed that there are good 
reasons for compensating the victims of option luck. Finally, the free will argument showed 
that there are good reasons for treating apparent instances of pure choice as only partially 
matters of choice. None of these three arguments requires a departure from the principles that 
luck egalitarians should accept for reasons independent of the abandonment objection, and 
the final argument does not even require revision of the standard luck egalitarian position. 
There are, then, several strong grounds for thinking that luck egalitarianism provides robust 
support for public insurance. 
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